Introduction
In line with the themes set out by the editors of this book, this chapter sheds light on the governance dynamics in the sector of global finance. Focusing on the historical evolution of the policies governing the movement of cross-border capital flows, the chapter illustrates that these policies can be fruitfully analysed from a diachronic perspective that brings into reliefs the mix of policy instruments and architectural features that usually characterize governance arrangements at each point in time (Capano et al. 2012) . The chapter then moves on to investigate the factors that help account for the governance dynamics of capital account policies from the 1940s to the present. Anticipating briefly the findings discussed below, the arrangements governing the movement of cross-border capital flows has evolved from an initial equilibrium point characterized by governance arrangements based on "command-and-control" policy instruments (such as capital controls) administered by domestic governments under the auspices of a public intergovernmental organization, to a new governance equilibrium based on softer policy instruments such as voluntary standards and best practices, whose enforcement has been primarily delegated to the exercise of market discipline. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, then, the direction of governance dynamics has somehow reversed its previous trend because of mixed combination of preceding modes of governance (Table 2 .1).
In order to explain the governance dynamics, I suggest that the evolution of international capital account policies reflects several factors that cannot be solely reduced to the instrumental and conscious will of governments. While governments, especially those of the advanced economies, were certainly important to the development of the governance arrangements primarily because they facilitated the globalization of finance by refraining from intervening in the markets, a full understanding of the evolution of the governance arrangements would be incomplete without taking into consideration their relationship with the external, social environment as well as the constraints to change that initial equilibrium points exerted on the choices of governance arrangements over time.
Indeed, as will be illustrated below, the evolution of capital account policies were heavily shaped by the ideational environment in which governments and other social actors operate and by public perceptions of the relevance of the policy field. When the ideational cohesiveness around specific governance modes weakened and changed, as was the case in the 1970s with the shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism, the governance arrangements came under pressure for change. In other words, similarly to the effect exerted by the increase in the numbers of institutional venues that policy actors use to pursue their interests (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) , the emergence of a new ideational context increased the pressure for change in the governance equilibrium. Pressures for change also stemmed from the increased social 
